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Employment Discrimination Against
Persons with AIDS
by Arthur S. Leonard
[Editor's Note: Since this article was first published, there have
been some more recent developments in case law, particularly
with respect to the applicability of antidiscrimination provisions
of the Rehabilitation Act to persons with chronic, contagious
diseases, Arline v. School Board of Nassau County, 772 F2d
759 (l1th Cir. 1985), as well as some statutory developments.
The author has written an article on employment discrimination
against persons with AIDS to be published this year in Hofstra
Law Review, and a chapter on the same topic to be included in
the upcoming revised AIDS Legal Guide published by Lambda
Legal Defense and Education Fund. As the legal issues sur-
rounding AIDS evolve, advocates with affected clients should be
alert to current developments.]
I. Introduction
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), a con-
dition which renders the human immune system incapable of
defending against certain unusual fatal illnesses, was first diag-
nosed as a distinct disease entity in 1981.' By April, 1985, the
United States Centers for Disease Control (CDC) had reported
The author is Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. B.S.,
Cornell University (1974); J.D., Harvard Law School (1977). The
author wishes to acknowledge with appreciation the support of the
administration and the trustees of New York Law School in providing a
faculty research grant to underwrite work on this article during the
summer of 1984 and the services of a student research assistant, Gary
Stein, during the 1983 fall term.
Reprinted with permission from University of Dayton Law Review. ©
Copyright 1985 by the University of Dayton Law Review.
I. Although it now appears that isolated cases of AIDS were occur-
ring in the United States as early as 1979, the general recognition
of AIDS as a distinct entity probably dates to 1981, when the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) began to investigate reports of
unusual opportunistic infections in New York and California. The
first official reporting on AIDS was contained in CDC's Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report, June 5, 1981 [hereinafter cited as
MMWR]. Foege, The National Pattern of AIDS, in THE AIDS
EPIDEMic 7 (K. Cahill ed. 1983). See generally A. FErrNE & W.
CHECK, THE TRUTH ABOUT AIDS (1984). For a concise account
of the history of the epidemic through early 1984, see Comment,
AIDS: A Legal Epidemic?, 17 AKRON L. REv. 717, 718-22
(1984).
almost 10,000 cases of the most severe form of this condition in
the United States. 2 Informed observers speculate that up to ten
times as many people suffer from milder forms of the syn-
drome, and an undetermined portion of those will develop the
full, usually fatal, syndrome. 3 Because the mortality rate for
persons with CDC-defined AIDS is very high, 4 the progress of
the disease is disfiguring and painful, and the means by which
the disease is transmitted have remained mysterious, public fear
surrounding AIDS victims has produced a legal crisis as well as
a health crisis.
5
2. As of September 24, 1984, the CDC had counted 6,122 cases of
AIDS. N.Y. Native, Oct. 8, 1984, at 17. By October 22, 1984, the
CDC count had reached 6,517, an increase of almost 400 cases in
one month. N.Y. Native, Nov. 5, 1984, at 16. (The New York
Native is a biweekly newspaper serving the New York City metro-
politan gay and lesbian community. Unlike the "mainstream"
press in this area, which has provided only sporadic reporting on
AIDS, the Native has published the latest CDC statistics, inter-
views with scientists engaged in AIDS research, and lengthy
columns by doctors and other scientific experts reporting and
analyzing new developments, in virtually every issue since the
AIDS epidemic began to receive notice in the gay community.) In
February 1985, as controversy developed over a blood test for
antibodies to HTLV-III virus, the CDC reported that its AIDS case
count had passed eight thousand. Altman, U.S. Delays Licensing
Blood Test to Detect AIDS, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at B16,
col. 3. On April 8, 1985, the CDC reported that the count had
reached 9,405. N.Y. Native, April 22, 1985, at 13.
3. Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc., Health Letter No. 4, at 1 (Aug.
1984) [hereinafter cited as GMHC-4]. Gay Men's Health Crisis,
Inc., is a nonprofit organization formed in 1982 by gay men in
New York City concerned with the lack of attention paid to the
growing medical crisis of AIDS by the government and the medical
research establishment. Among its activities of patient services,
counseling, testifying before agencies on AIDS-related issues, and
public education, GMHC publishes newsletters written by scientif-
ic professionals reporting and explaining the latest information
about AIDS. GMHC publications are a major source of informa-
tion for anybody researching the current status of the AIDS
epidemic.
4. According to the CDC, as of September 24, 1984, 45% of the
confirmed cases of AIDS had resulted in death. N.Y. Native, Nov.
5, 1984, at 16. As of February II, 1985, the CDC reported a
mortality rate of approximately 48%. Sullivan, Blood Center Fears
Impact of AIDS Test, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1985, at BI, col. 5.
5. The legal crisis surrounding AIDS involves many areas of the law.
A legal guide published by Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Inc., to assist attorneys in working with people who have
AIDS, covers such diverse issues as legal rights to services (hospi-
tal care, ambulance transport, and funeral arrangements), confi-
dentiality of medical records, medical powers of attorney, estate
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One of the manifestations of these fears is employment
discrimination against persons with AIDS, persons perceived as
having AIDS, and persons who are members of publicly identi-
fied "risk groups"--gay males, intravenous drug abusers, Haitians,
and hemophiliacs. 6 Pro bono legal assistance groups have been
formed in the three urban centers with the largest number of
AIDS cases-New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. 7
Their experience has included a number of cases in which
employers, either upon their own motion or at the behest of
coworkers, have taken adverse action, including termination of
employment, against such persons. 8 The question whether legal
protection against such discrimination exists has not been liti-
gated to an appellate level in any jurisdiction, and a variety of
legal forums have been explored in attempts to resolve these
cases. For example, some administrative agencies in New York
which enforce statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
physical disability or handicap have made initial determinations
5. (cont.)
planning and administration, housing rights, public benefits (espe-
cially disability benefits), insurance law, immigration law (an issue
of particular concern with respect to illegal aliens suffering from
AIDS), and employment discrimination. Lambda Legal Defense
and Education Fund, Inc. (Lambda), is a nonprofit public interest
law firm founded in 1973 which litigates test cases in the area of
gay and lesbian rights and promotes public education on the legal
aspects of the rights of gay people through programs and publica-
tions. LAMBDA, AIDS LEGAL GUIDE (1984). See also A.
FETrNER & W. CHECK, supra note 1, at 223. For vivid illustra-
tions of the fears surrounding AIDS, see infra notes 65-66. For a
good overview of legal issues stemming from AIDS, see Flaherty,
A Legal Emergency Brewing over AIDS, 6 Nat'l. L.J., July 9,
1984, at 1, col. 3; see also Comment, supra note 1.
6. Figures from CDC, dated July 16, 1984, showed the following
breakdown of reported cases of AIDS: homosexual or bisexual-
71.8%; drug abusers-17.5%; hemophiliacs-0.7%; all others (in-
cluding persons born in Haiti)-10%. GMHC-4, supra note 3, at
2. A CDC analysis of cases, reported as of September 24, 1984,
divided the cases by patient characteristics as follows: gay and
bisexual males-73%; drug abusers-17%; hemophiliacs-l %;
Haitians-4%; individuals who apparently contracted AIDS through
blood tranfusions-l%; others-4%. N.Y. Native, Oct. 8, 1984, at
18. When an individual showed characteristics of more than one
category, CDC would assign the individual to the category with the
largest number of cases. Comment, supra note 1, at 721 n.56. The
result may be to overemphasize the proportion of AIDS cases
which may be attributable to homosexual sexual contact and
underemphasize the number attributable to intravenous drug use,
and may, as some argue, result in the creation of a spurious
category of "Haitians." The September 24, 1984, percentage
breakdown remained substantially the same in the figures released
on April 8, 1985, by the CDC, except CDC had by then eliminated
the category of Haitians. N.Y. Native, Apr. 22, 1985, at 13.
7. CDC figures list New York City (3,285 cases), San Francisco
(1,107 cases), and Los Angeles (794 cases) as the cities with the
largest number of AIDS cases as of April 8, 1985. The next
largest, with 336 AIDS cases, was Miami. N.Y. Native, Apr. 22,
1985, at 13. Pro bono panels have also been organized in Washing-
ton, D.C., and Detroit.
8. The New York City Commission on Human Rights issued a report
on August 27, 1984, describing a rise in discrimination involving
antigay bias. The commission attributed part of the rise in bias to
the AIDS epidemic. Report of N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rights,
UP-DATE: The Gay and Lesbian Discrimination Documentation
Project: November 1983 through June 1984, Aug. 27, 1984. The
Pro Bono Panel of the Bar Association for Human Rights of
Greater New York, which provides free legal services to persons
with AIDS referred through GMHC and Lambda, has reported
numerous cases of employment discrimination against gays and
others who have contracted AIDS.
that persons with AIDS may be protected under the New York
statutes and administrative regulations. Rapid administrative
investigation of such charges has resulted in satisfactory settle-
ments of some cases. 9 Experience has shown that when employ-
ers are provided with the facts about AIDS and are convinced
that discrimination against persons with AIDS may be unlawful,
they are usually willing to negotiate a settlement that respects
the rights of the person with AIDS.' 0
The purpose of this article is two-fold: first, to present
clearly the facts about AIDS as they relate to employment
rights, and, second, to demonstrate the degree to which laws
forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of physical
disability or handicap provide protection for persons with AIDS.
II. AIDS--A Brief Description
The body fights off infection by a series of complicated
processes which are collectively called the immune system. The
internal processes of the immune system include three stages:
first, the identification of foreign agents that have entered the
body; second, the formation of antibodies capable of rendering
the foreign agents harmless; and third, the regulation of produc-
tion of these antibodies when the foreign agents are detected."
Current theories about AIDS center on the process of
regulation of the production of antibodies. Many scientists now
believe that a viral agent, 12 perhaps in combination with, or in
9. The author has dealt directly with the New York City Human
Rights Commission and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance
Programs in a case of AIDS-based discrimination. Both agencies
concluded that they had jurisdiction to investigate the case. The
New York State Division of Human Rights and the counterpart
state agency in New Jersey have also informed lawyers on the Pro
Bono Panel of the Bar Association for Human Rights that they
believe their agencies have jurisdiction to pursue discrimination
claims filed by people with AIDS, and similar changes are pending
before state agencies in Florida and Michigan. In a case involving
discrimination in "public accommodations" on account of AIDS,
the New York State Attorney General, determining that AIDS was
a covered "handicap" under the New York Human Rights law,
brought suit for damages and injunctive relief against a cooperative
apartment board of directors which refused to renew the lease of a
gay doctor who had treated many AIDS patients on the premises.
Although the case was settled favorably for the plaintiff before
going to trial or generating a final decision by the court, the trial
judge, in an unpublished opinion, overruled a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim under the statute, implicitly affirming the
attorney general's conclusion that AIDS was covered by the state
law. The case was eventually settled with the doctor receiving
damages, attorney fees, and a new lease. People v. 49 West 12
Tenants Corp., No. 43604/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 17, 1983).
10. Telephone interview with Mathew J. Shebar, legal services direc-
tor, Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc. (Apr. 24, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as Shebar interview].
11. A. FETrNER & W. CHECK, supra note 1, at 42-58; Good, Immu-
nologic Aberrations: The AIDS Defect, in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC
41 (K. Cahill ed. 1983).
12. An American research team, led by Dr. Robert C. Gallo, at the
National Institutes of Health identified human T-cell lymphotrophic
virus (variant III), abbreviated as HTLV-III, as the suspected AIDS
virus in the spring of 1984. A French research team, headed by Dr.
Luc Montagnier, had earlier identified another virus (LAV) as a
suspected cause of AIDS. Dr. Gallo contends that the two viruses
are variants of the same virus. Comment, supra note 1, at 724
n.87; D'Eramo, Discovering the Cause of AIDS: An Interview with
Dr. Robert C. Galo, N.Y. Native, Aug. 27, 1984, at 16-19. Dr.
Montagnier has recently asserted that the two viruses are virtually
identical. Beldekas, Face to Face: The Media and AIDS, N.Y.
Native, Feb. 25, 1985, at 17.
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the presence of one or more as yet unidentified "cofactors,"
attacks and destroys certain cells (called T-helper lymphocytes)
whose normal function is to signal for the production of certain
antibodies. 13 As a result, the organs of the immune system
which produce these antibodies are not activated, and the
foreign agents proceed unhindered to damage the body in a
variety of ways.
As defined by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),
the full AIDS syndrome occurs when the number of T-helper
lymphocytes are so reduced that certain "opportunistic infec-
tions" associated with the syndrome occur. Among these infec-
tions are Kaposi's sarcoma, a rare skin cancer, and pneumocystis
carinii pneumonia, an uncommon lung ailment.' 4 While many
persons with AIDS who have developed these "opportunistic
infections" require extensive hospitalization, some (especially
those who have Kaposi's sarcoma or less serious infections and
are receiving and responding to therapy) are treated on an
outpatient basis and are physically capable of working.
Preliminary studies indicate that large numbers of indi-
viduals in the "risk group" populations 15 may have been
exposed to the viral agents associated with AIDS but have not
developed any symptoms of the syndrome.1 6 A subgroup of
those exposed, consisting of perhaps ten times the number of
those who have CDC-defined AIDS, have developed some
physical symptoms which have been interpreted as warning
signs of the possible onset of the syndrome. 17 These symptoms
include lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph nodes), weight loss,
abnormal fatigue, night sweats, and a clinically observable
decrease in the production of T-helper lymphocytes in their
blood.' 8 Some individuals with these "warning" symptoms
will go on to develop CDC-defined AIDS--others will not.
Although the severity of the "warning" symptoms and their
impact on the physical capabilities of those individuals experi-
encing them varies with each individual, many exhibiting these
symptoms are physically capable of working.
It is hypothesized that the viral agent is transmitted
through blood contact as a result of sexual intercourse, blood
13. For a more technical explanation of the physiology of AIDS, see
Comment, supra note 1, at 722-23. On August 3, 1984, the CDC
reported that its researchers had succeeded in causing a version of
AIDS in research primates using the HTLV-III virus, thus provid-
ing evidence that the virus is a probable cause of the disease in
humans. GMHC-4, supra note 3, at 6.
14. Foege, supra note 1; Good, supra note 9. For a more detailed
treatment of the various opportunistic infections associated with the
syndrome, see Armstrong, Viral Infections; Louria, Bacterial and
Mycotic Infections; Cahill, Parasitic Infections; Safai, Kaposi's
Sarcoma, all in THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (K. Cahill ed. 1983). The
CDC surveillance definition for AIDS can be found in L. MASS,
MEDICAL ANSWERS ABOuT AIDS 3-4 (GMHC 1984), and in
LAMBDA, supra note 5, at C-l.
15. See supra text accompanying note 6.
16. GMHC-4, supra note 3. See also D'Eramo, AIDS Crisis Worse
Than Ever, N.Y. Native, Oct. 8, 1984, at 12, quoting Dr. James
Curran of CDC: "It is clear that a majority of people will not
develop AIDS within the first few years after exposure to the
virus."
17. GMHC-4, supra note 3.
18. K. MAYER & H. PIZER, THE AIDS FAcr BOOK 25-34 (1983);
Beldekas, supra note 10, at 17, reporting the remarks of Dr.
Montagnier at an AIDS symposium in New York City on February
8, 1985.
transfusions, or shared use of needles by drug users. 19 It is also
hypothesized that other body fluids, such as sweat and saliva,
may act as transmission agents, 20 but the strongest case is made
for blood transmission. Public health officials have asserted that
current theories about the AIDS syndrome and its epidemiology
would not be consistent with transmission by casual contact of
the sort that occurs in a typical workplace (i.e., that AIDS is
not spread by mere touching or airborne transmission of the
virus).
2
'
The tentative identification of a particular virus as a
cause of AIDS has led to intensive research in two directions:
first, researchers have sought to develop tests which will detect
the virus or evidence of its presence (past or present) in the
blood and, second, researchers seek to create a vaccine that can
trigger production of antibodies for the virus which render it
harmless before it can attack the body's T-helper lymphocytes.
22
CDC licensed several tests for screening blood donations in
March of 1985, amid controversy about their accuracy and the
interpretation of their results. 23 If these tests prove effective,
transmission through blood transfusions (a very small percent-
age of the known cases of AIDS) 24 can be eliminated by
screening donated blood to detect the virus. If a vaccine is
discovered (a development which may not occur soon), those
who have not yet been exposed to the virus can be protected
against future infection through its administration. 25 However,
if present estimates of the proportion of the population already
exposed to the virus are correct, neither a blood test nor a
vaccine would have an immediate, substantial impact on the
number of new cases of AIDS in the absence of some effective
method of preventing full development of the syndrome in
those already infected. 2 6 In fact, the nature of AIDS indicates
that an effective treatment for those who have developed the
syndrome will require a major breakthrough in medical research-a
19. K. MAYER & H. PIZER, supra note 18, at 36-40; Foege, supra note
1, at 14-16.
20. Altman, AIDS Studies Hint Saliva May Transmit Infection, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at Cl, col. 1; D'Eramo, supra note 12.
21. L. Mass, supra note 14; Fain, Study Doubts Casual Spread of
AIDS, The Advocate, Apr. 30, 1985, at 22; Comment, supra note
1, at 724-25.
22. Cooper, The High-Stakes Race Is on to Develop Blood Test for
AIDS Virus, 16 NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1984, at 1470-72; Fain,
Ambivalent Support for AIDS Vaccine, The Advocate, Apr. 30,
1985, at 22; Comment, supra note 1, at 724 n.87.
23. Fain, Opposition to Antibody Test Grows, The Advocate, Apr. 16,
1985, at 22.
24. See supra note 6.
25. In remarks delivered at a February 8, 1985, symposium in New
York City, Dr. Luc Montagnier opined that an effective vaccine
would be impossible to develop due to wide genetic variations
observed in different strains of the suspected virus. Beldekas, supra
note 12. Dr. Montagnier's pessimistic view was echoed at an
international conference of AIDS researchers in Atlanta, Georgia,
during April of 1985. Scott, Prevention Seen as Only Hope for
AIDS, Wash. Blade, Apr. 19, 1985, at 1.
26. Dr. James Curran, director of the AIDS program at CDC, has
stated that as many as 200,000 people may have already been
exposed to the suspected virus and that AIDS would probably be
the major cause of death for gay men through the end of the
century. In a newspaper interview dated September 24, 1984, Dr.
Curran stated: "In spite of the good intentions and continuing
efforts of the gay community and the scientific sector, we should
not expect scientific technology to rescue us from AIDS in the next
few years, although eventually technology may help conquer the
disease." D'Eramo, supra note 16.
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method of stimulating the manufacture of new T-helper lym-
phocytes or a method of artificially simulating the function of
these lymphocytes. 27 Consequently, the heavily publicized an-
nouncement of identification of a virus associated with AIDS
does not ensure that the problems of discrimination against
persons with AIDS will disappear quickly, because there will
probably be many thousands of additional cases.
28
III. AIDS in the Workplace
Persons infected with the so-called "AIDS virus" do not
present a uniform profile in terms of their physical condition
and suitability for employment. Current descriptions of the
disease and its course indicate that there are four categories of
such individuals, each of which may present different issues in
the workplace:
(I) Those who have been exposed to the virus but who
display no physical symptoms (a category whose known mem-
bers may increase dramatically as the blood tests licensed by
CDC come into general use);
(II) Those who display symptoms characterized as "warn-
ing" symptoms that AIDS may develop;
(III) Those who have contracted an opportunistic infec-
tion indicating development of the syndrome but who do not
require hospitalization and are physically able to work;
(IV) Those who have contracted multiple infections or
require extended hospitalization, or who have been so weakened
by such infections and the syndrome that they are relatively
immobile.2
9
Discrimination in the workplace is primarily experi-
enced by members of the first three categories. It is unlikely
that an individual in category IV would be capable of perform-
ing continued work. Those in the second and third categories
are the individuals who are presently encountering the most
serious discrimination problems. In addition, those in the first
category, once identified, may well encounter discrimination
similar to those in categories II and III. Indeed, some of the
cases handled by the pro bono legal panels involved persons
who may have been in category I (or who may not even have
been exposed to the virus), and have suffered employment
discrimination because they were perceived as presenting a
problem as members of a "risk group" who had sought
medical assistance or were known associates of individuals with
AIDS.3°
The key aspects of AIDS relevant to the concerns of
employers, fellow employees, and business customers center on
infectiousness and physical ability. While questions about
27. All sources consulted in the preparation of this article agree that at
present there is no known treatment that restores the immune
system function, although various experimental treatments are now
being tested. E.g., Comment, supra note I, at 725-26; Fain,
Health, The Advocate, Nov. 13, 1984, at 16-17.
28. At a conference of AIDS researchers held in Atlanta in April,
1985, it was asserted that the number of total cases (then 10,000)
could double over the next year. Scott, supra note 25.
29. Shebar interview, supra note 10.
30. In one particularly egregious case handled by the New York Pro
Bono Panel, an individual was discharged when it was learned that
he had gone to the hospital to visit a friend who had AIDS.
Another case involved a gay employee who was fired because his
employer assumed that his request to take time off to see a doctor
meant that he had AIDS. Comment, supra note 1, at 735.
infectiousness may not yet be answered definitively, it appears
that under normal workplace conditions infectiousness is not a
real problem. 31 During the early history of the AIDS epidemic,
it was sometimes suggested that persons infected with AIDS
should not be employed in food preparation or serving, or in
other occupations where a personal service may require physical
contact with customers. While such suggestions might have had
some surface plausibility when virtually nothing was known
about how AIDS might be transmitted, current views about the
epidemiology of AIDS suggest that they reflect undue panic, as
there is apparently no solid evidence of anyone contracting
AIDS through food or external physical contact.
32
The issues surrounding physical ability are complicated
by the unpredictable progress of the disease. Someone infected
with the virus may appear perfectly healthy and suddenly
develop skin lesions characteristic of Kaposi's sarcoma. Others
may exhibit many of the debilitating "warning" symptoms,
such as fatigue and weight loss, which impact upon the physical
ability to perform work, without developing an opportunistic
infection. It seems clear, however, that some proportion of
those in categories I, II, and IlI are fully capable of working,
and, both psychologically and financially, need to keep working
as long as they are physically able to do so. The AIDS literature
does not suggest that the physical exertion of working necessar-
ily provokes a worsening of the disease. Although it might
seem that a person with a compromised immune system would
be more likely to contract infections if he or she came into
contact with large numbers of people, such would not necessar-
31. GMHC-4, supra note 3. Based on expert testimony, a New York
trial judge held in a case involving a prison work setting that AIDS
was not spread by casual contact in the workplace. LaRocca v.
Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. Duchess
County 1983). An arbitrator, ruling under a collective bargaining
agreement in the case of an AIDS-diagnosed airline flight atten-
dant, came to the same conclusion. Guilfoy, United Employee
Reinstated, Gay Community News (Boston), Feb. 16, 1985, at 3;
Newsbrief, The Advocate, Mar. 5, 1985, at 20.
32. The New York State Health Department, AIDS Institute, has
published posters for workplace use which state: "There is no
evidence that a person can get AIDS from handshakes, dishes,
toilet seats, door knobs, or from daily contact with a person who
has AIDS." As epidemiological studies of reported cases advance,
the percentage of cases which cannot be assigned to one of the
suspected models of transmission has dwindled to 4%. See supra
note 6.
This article is primarily concerned with the statutory bases
for combating employment discrimination against persons with
AIDS. However, where discrimination occurs in a unionized workplace
governed by a collective bargaining agreement, resort to labor
arbitration may provide the speediest and most effective form of
relief.
An airline flight attendant diagnosed with AIDS was placed
on medical leave by United Airlines in 1983 without being given a
physical examination to determine his ability to perform his job.
An impartial arbitrator appointed under the collective bargaining
agreement heard expert medical testimony about AIDS and ruled
that the airline could not implement a policy of automatically
laying off employees diagnosed with AIDS. Rather, a physical
examination would be required to determine the flight attendant's
fitness to work. The arbitrator rejected the argument that an
employee with AIDS would automatically pose a health threat to
fellow employees or passengers. Traynor v. United Airlines, (Jan.
7, 1985) (unreported arbitration decision). See Guilfoy, supra note
31; Newsbrief, supra note 31; telephone interview with Martin
Wagner, arbitrator (Feb. 20, 1985).
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ily be the case if the physiological conditions that lead to
opportunistic infections when the immune system is compromised
are either so ubiquitous that only total isolation from human
contact would prevent infection or if the person with AIDS (or
indeed, a large proportion of the pertinent "risk group" popula-
tions) has these triggering conditions in his or her system
anyway, awaiting the opportunity to develop in the absence of
immune function. The opportunistic infections associated with
AIDS have previously been observed in persons whose immune
systems were compromised by immuno-suppressive medical
treatment or other illnesses, suggesting that they are not some-
thing "caught" from the surrounding environment, but rather
something generated from physiological conditions normally
found in the body, but harmless in the presence of an adequate-
ly functioning immune system. Consequently, in the absence of
better evidence that workplace exertion and exposure present a
serious risk either to the person with AIDS or coworkers and
customers, persons with AIDS who are physically able to work
should be treated in the same way as others with physical
disabilities who are, despite those disabilities, physically capa-
ble of performing a job.
IV. Handicap Discrimination Laws-
Applicability to AIDS
American law presumes that the employment relation-
ship in the private sector is "at will" unless the employer's
discretion to terminate the relationship has been abridged by
contract, statute, or, in some jurisdictions, public policy. Due to
constitutional due process guarantees restricting the government
when it is acting as an employer, and to federal and state civil
service laws and regulations restricting discharge to some ap-
proximation of "just cause" similar to that found in private
sector collective bargaining agreements, public sector employ-
ees have somewhat more job security. 33 Federal and state
legislation against employment discrimination in both sectors
provides a major exception to the "at will" principle, and
prohibitions of discrimination on the basis of physical disability
or handicap have become a prominent feature of such laws in
recent years. 34
There is no nationwide, comprehensive, regulatory scheme
governing disability discrimination. The federal govemment, in
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, prohibits discrimination in its
own employment practices, and the practices of its large con-
tractors and programs receiving federal financial assistance.
35
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have adopted
legislation forbidding such discrimination in private (and in
33. See generally P. SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE (1969); Summers, Individual Protection against Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976).
34. Comment, Employment Discrimination-Analyzing Handicap Dis-
crimination Claims: The Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C.L. REv.
535 (1984). Federal and state statutes almost uniformly use the
term "handicap," although the individuals involved prefer the
term "disability."
35. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is the source of
federal prohibitions of employment discrimination against handi-
capped persons. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96(i) (1982). Section 793
requires most federal contractors to undertake affirmative action to
employ handicapped individuals in performing their contracts. Id. §
793. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act forbids employment
most jurisdictions public) sector employment, with an addition-
al five states prohibiting such discrimination only in the public
sector. Three states have no legislation on the subject.3 6
Because of the widely varying language defining cov-
ered persons (as well as widely varying interpretations of such
language by state courts), and the lack of case law discussing
conditions (such as AIDS) due to illness or communicable
diseases, the general applicability of all of these laws to persons
with AIDS cannot simply be assumed. In two states the statutes
expressly exclude coverage for persons suffering from "com-
municable diseases," 37 and one state expressly excludes cover-
age for disability by virtue of illness; 38 one might conclude in
the absence of case law that coverage for AIDS may not easily
be obtained in those three jurisdictions.
Although the definitional language varies widely among
the states, certain patterns of terminology emerge. The most
common terminology is contained in the federal law and repeat-
ed, with minor variations, in pertinent laws or regulations in
thirteen jurisdictions, defining a "handicapped" person as one
who "has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities." 39 The
35. (cont.)
discrimination against handicapped persons by programs receiving
federal financial assistance. Id. § 794. In Consolidated Rail Corp.
v. Datrone, 104 S. Ct. 1298 (1984), the Supreme Court held that §
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 applied to all federal
financial assistance, not just to that specifically aimed at creating
jobs in the programs assisted. In a contemporaneous, consistent
decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that receipt of
Medicare and Medicaid funds by hospitals made them subject to
the nondiscrimination policies of § 504. United States v. Baylor
Univ. Medical Center, 736 F2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 958 (1985). Subsequently, airlines using airports that
were constructed and operated with federal financial assistance
have been held subject to the act. Paralyzed Veterans of America v.
Civil Aeronautics Bd., 752 F2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section 501
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 imposes the same nondiscrimination
policies on "departments, agencies, and instrumentalities" of the
federal executive branch, including the postal service. See Prewitt
v. United States Postal Serv., 662 E2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
36. State laws pertaining to employment discrimination are conveniently
collected in LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL,
vol. 8A, and EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH), vol. 3. Jurisdictions
which apparently do not have laws forbidding discrimination against
handicapped persons are Arizona, Delaware, Wyoming, Puerto
Rico, and Virgin Islands. Jurisdictions protecting only public
employees are Alabama, Arkansas, Idaho, Mississippi, and South
Dakota. Legislation pending in Virginia and Wyoming as of April,
1985, may change the compositions of these lists and other catego-
ries based on statute terminology.
37. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6a-3(b) (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.140(2)(c) (Baldwin 1981).
38. New Hampshire defines "handicap" as a "handicap, other than
illness, unrelated to a person's ability to perform a particular job."
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(xiii) (1984). However the
administrative rules promulgated under the statute, H.U.M. §
405.1, define "illness" as a "short term, temporary medical
condition." This definition arguably would not include AIDS,
because it is more correctly classified under the administrative
definition of "handicap" as "a permanent, long term, or chronic
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more major life activities." If the New Hampshire courts look to
the administrative definitions as authoritative, AIDS may be cov-
ered despite the statutory exclusion of coverage for illness.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301
(1982) (does not include mental handicaps); GA. CODE ANN. §
45-19-22(3) (1982); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:2253(1) (West
1982); MAss. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 151B, § 1 (West Supp.
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Rehabilitation Act, and ten of the thirteen jurisdictions, also
expressly extend coverage to those not presently disabled but
who have "a record of such impairment" or are "regarded as
having such an impairment."' Some jurisdictions go on to
define "major life activities" in terms of physical actions
typical of a normal, healthy existence, emphasizing use of the
senses, locomotion, and rational thought, but these "list"
definitions (which do not mention "immune function" as a
major life activity) are, from their context, clearly not meant to
be exhaustive or exclusive. 4 1 Some of the laws further define
"impairment" in terms of various organs and body systems,
and such definitions usually include reference to the hemic
(blood) and lymphatic systems, i.e., the central organs of the
immune function. 42 Persons with AIDS would appear to be
within the "impairment" category because the ability to fight
infection and preserve health is logically a "major life func-
tion," albeit less visible than walking, talking, or lifting. AIDS
is certainly an "impairment" of that function, especially when
the statutory "clinical" definition of "impairment" includes
those organs central to the immune function. More specifically,
individuals suffering from either discrimination because of med-
ical treatment or from a general perception of them as "AIDS
risks" would be covered in those jurisdictions which extend the
definition to include individuals with a record of disability or
who are regarded as having a disability.
4 3
Six jurisdictions have enacted some variation of a basic
definition which covers "anatomical, physiological or neuro-
logical disability, infirmity, malformation, or disfigurement which
is caused by injury, birth defect, or illness." 4 Coverage of
persons with AIDS under this definition seems likely as the
syndrome of suppressed immune function is clearly a physio-
logical disability or infirmity caused by an illness. Three
jurisdictions have definitions which are similar, albeit truncat-
39. (cont.)
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(25) (West Supp. 1984); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(K) (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §
1301(4) (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.400(2)
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H) (Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-35-2(14) (Supp. 1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
495d(5) (Supp. 1984); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(t) (Supp. 1984); 16
PA. ADMIN. CODE § 44.4.
40. Of those jurisdictions listed in supra note 39, Georgia, Utah, and
West Virginia do not mention protection for those with a record of
disability or those regarded as disabled, and Georgia specifically
excludes coverage for individuals with communicable diseases.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Some other states which
do not use the federal definition of handicap do incorporate these
concepts of extended coverage into their statutes or regulations.
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.34.(1) (West Supp. 1984).
41. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(L) (1978).
42. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(H)(i) (Supp. 1984).
43. In this regard, it is significant that some state courts have found
that protection extends to people with a record of a disability, or
who are regarded as having a disability, even though their state
statutes do not expressly provide for such coverage, on the theory
that such individuals are suffering discrimination because of preju-
dice against the disabled--the prohibited motivation under the
statute. See Comment, supra note 34, at 541-48. For a discussion
of the logical bases for extending coverage to perceived disabili-
ties, see Note, Cancer as a Protected Handicap in Illinois, 60 CHI.
[-] KENT L. REv. 715 (1984).
44. A .sIKA STAT. § 18.80.300 (1984); see, e.g., ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 4553 (1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49(b), § 15(g)
(1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(16) (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102(8) (1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-5-5(q) (West
Supp. 1984-1985).
ed, specifying a physical handicap, infirmity or impairment
which may result, inter alia, from illness. 45 Four jurisdictions
merely require a "condition" which constitutes a substantial
disability,46 while other individual jurisdictions with their own
peculiarly worded definitions introduce further variants of the
above definitions. 47 Some state laws prohibiting handicap dis-
crimination provide no definition of "handicap. ' 4' Several
states require that the disability have a long-term or permanent
aspect, as opposed to a transient condition caused by a short-
term illness; other states require that the disabling condition be
"medically diagnosable. ' 49 Perhaps the simplest, most wide-
ranging definition is found in the state of Washington's Admin-
istrative Code: ".... for enforcement purposes, a person will be
considered handicapped ... if he or she is discriminated against
because of the condition and the condition is abnormal." 50
These laws are very new and there is little case law explicating
45. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West Supp. 1984); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-2502(23) (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 68, §
1-103(l) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-1985).
46. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-3(q) (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2(ll)
(West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(0) (1981); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 296.010(4) (Vemon Supp. 1985).
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1292(h) (West 1980) ("physical handicap"
includes "impairment... of physical ability because of... loss of
function or coordination, or any other health impairment which
requires special education or related services."); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 378-1 (Supp. 1983) ("physical handicap" means "a
substantial physical impairment where such handicap is verified by
medical finding and appears reasonably certain to continue through-
out the lifetime of the individual without substantial improvement.");
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(b)(i) (West Supp. 1984)
("handicap" means "a determinable physical... characteristic of
an individual.., which may result from disease.., which.., is
unrelated to the individual's ability to perform the duties of a
particular job or position, or is unrelated to the individual's
qualifications for employment or promotion."); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 292(21) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1984) ("handicap" means
"physical... impairment resulting from... physiological.. .conditions
which prevents the exercise of a normal bodily function or is
demonstrated by medically accepted clinical or laboratory diagno-
sis techniques .. "); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(13) (Page
1980 & Supp. 1984) ("handicap" means "A medically diagnos-
able, abnormal condition which is expected to continue for a
considerable length of time ... which can reasonably be expected
to limit the person's functional ability ... or any limitation due to
weakness and significantly decreased endurance .. "); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 2-7-35 (Law. Co-op. 1983) (essentially similar to Hawaii
statute); TEX. HUM. REs. CODE ANN. § 121.002(4) (Vernon 1980)
(" 'handicapped person' means a person who has a... physical.
handicap, including ... hardness of hearing, deafness, speech
impairment, visual handicap, being crippled, or any other health
impairment which requires special ambulatory devices or services.");
WIs. STAT. ANN. § I 1.32(8)(a) (West Supp. 1984) (a person has a
physical handicap if he "has a physical.. . impairment which
makes achievement unusually difficult or limits the capacity to
work...."); WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. § 166-22-040 ("a person
will be considered to be handicapped ... if he or she is discriminat-
ed against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal.").
48. Those states with no statutory definition of "handicap" or "disa-
bility" include: Florida, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
Virginia.
49. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 378-1 (Supp. 1983); MICH. COMp. LAWS
ANN. § 37.1103(b)(i) (West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4112.01(13) (Page 1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 2-7-35(1) (Law
Co-op. 1983). See also New Hampshire definition of "illness,"
supra note 38.
50. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 166-22-040.
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the definitions of coverage. 5 1 Most case law supports the
assertion that a condition such as AIDS is a "disability" or
"handicap" of the type covered by these laws, although none
of the cases discuss a condition exactly like AIDS.
52
Virtually all of the jurisdictions provide that discrimina-
tion against the disabled is lawful if the physical requirements
of the job cannot be performed by the individual; however, the
phrasing of these exceptions varies widely, producing different
tests in different jurisdictions. The federal Rehabilitation Act's
phrase, "otherwise qualified handicapped individual," 53 clearly
connotes that a person who can perform the requirements of the
job, despite his disability, must be treated equally with others
who have no physical disability. Some statutes, however, speak
in terms of the disability having to be "unrelated" to actual job
requirements in order for coverage to apply 54-a formulation
which, if literally applied, would remove coverage from a large
51. A review of the BNA and CCH employment practice reporters
revealed judicial consideration of the scope of coverage for disabil-
ities in fewer than half of the jurisdictions which have statutes. See
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 E Supp. 1088 (D. Hawaii 1980);
Welsh v. Municipality of Anchorage, 676 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1984);
American National Ins. Co. v. Fair Empl. & Hous. Comm'n, 34
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 818 (Cal. 1982); Summers v. Iowa
C.R.C., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,260 (Iowa 1983); Kubik
v. CNA Fin. Corp., 96 Ill. App. 3d 715, 422 N.E.2d 39 (1981);
Advocates for the Handicapped v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 67 IIl.
App. 3d 52, 385 N.E.2d 39 (1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981
(1979); High v. Power Flame Div., 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH)
32,866 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 1982); Lewis v. Remmele Eng'g, Inc., 314
N.W.2d I (Minn. 1981); Anderson v. Exxon Co., 31 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 33,428 (N.J. 1982); Rogers v. Campbell Foundry
Co., 185 N.J. Super. 109 (1982); State Div. of Human Rights v.
Xerox Corp., 102 A.D.2d 543, 478 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1984); Pacific
Motor Trucking Co. v. Bureau of Labor, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 32,271 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), affd, 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 32,249 (5th Cir. 1984); Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
Bureau of Labor, 280 Or. 163, 570 P.2d 76 (1977); Amtrak v.
Pennsylvania, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,420 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 1983); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 448 A.2d 701
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982); Providence Journal Co. v. Mason, 116
R.I. 614, 359 A.2d 682 (1976); Salt Lake City Corp. v. Confer,
674 P.2d 632 (Utah 1983); Barnes v. Washington Natural Gas Co.,
22 Wash. App. 576, 591 P.2d 461 (1979); Chicago, M., St. P. &
P.R. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n, 87 Wash. 2d
802, 557 P.2d 307 (1976); Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 90 Wis.
2d 408, 280 N.W.2d 142 (1979); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Department of Indus., Labor, & Human Relations, 86 Wis. 2d
393, 273 N.W.2d 206 (1979). See also Wardlow v. Great Lakes
Express Co., 128 Mich. App. 54, 339 N.W.2d 670 (1983),
discussed in Ettinger, Accommodating the Handicapped Employee:
When Is the Burden Undue?, 63 MICH. BAR J. 831, 832 (1984)
(discussing recent cases). As noted above, there is no case law on
AIDS in the context of employment, but a New York judge held
AIDS to be a covered "handicap" under New York's law in People
v. 49 West 12 Tenants Corp., No. 43604/83 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
Oct. 17, 1983).
52. See, e.g., Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of Indus. Labor
& Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 344, 345
(Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
53. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982); see also Southeastern Community College
v. David, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979) (otherwise qualified person is
"one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite
of his handicap.").
54. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, § 1-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16 (1979); MICH. COMp.
LAWS § 37.1103 (Supp. 1984-1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 296.010
(Vernon Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(XIII)
(1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Supp.
1984-1985); South Carolina, Handicapped Bill of Rights, § 6.
proportion of otherwise qualified disabled persons. Some state
enforcement agencies and courts have interpreted these laws in
their official guidelines or rules to mean that the individual is
protected unless his or her disability substantially affects his or
her ability to do the job.55 Such an agency interpretation was
rejected by the Court of Appeals of New York, prompting a
subsequent amendment of the New York Human Rights law to
overrule the court and reinstate the agency's original interpre-
tation.56 In light of the New York experience, one cannot
assume that such "softening" administrative interpretations of
restrictive statutory language will be authoritative in jurisdic-
tions where the courts have not yet passed on their validity.
Many jurisdictions subject handicap discrimination plain-
tiffs to the same "bona fide occupational qualification" test
applicable to cases of sex or age discrimination.57 This statutory
test is frequently accompanied by regulatory interpretations
which rule out various "business justifications" that employers
have sometimes asserted, such as coworker or customer prefer-
ences or increased costs to the employer.58 Some jurisdictions
extend coverage to disabled individuals who can perform the
job with reasonable accommodations by the employer.59 Many
of these laws specify that employers need not employ the
disabled in situations where such employment would threaten
the health or the safety of the disabled employees, coworkers,
customers, or the general public.
60
Despite significant variations in language between juris-
dictions, some general observations can be made about poten-
tial protection from employment discrimination for persons with
AIDS. The question of discrimination against persons who
contract disabling infectious illnesses seems not to have been
directly considered by many state legislatures; however, those
which have considered it have occasionally expressed opposi-
55. See, e.g., ILL. COMM. GUIDELINES; MO. COMM. RULES, 4 C.S.R.
180-3.060; N.H. COMM. RULES § 405.3-4-5.6; S.C. COMM. RULES,
art. 7; VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (1981); Amtrak v. Pennsylvania, 31
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,420 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Nov. 18,
1982).
56. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 49
N.Y.2d 234, 401 N.E.2d 196, 425 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1980); State Div.
of Human Rights v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 727, 377
N.E.2d 117, 422 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1979) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
57. Those jurisdictions include: Connecticut, Iowa, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Washington, and West Virginia.
58. Those jurisdictions which rule out various business justifications
include: District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia.
59. E.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(a) (1982); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 46:2254(C)(1) (West 1982); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
151(B), § 4 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01
Subd. 25a(l) & (2) (West Supp. 1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4112.01(0)(1) (Page 1980 & Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. §
659.425(a) (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(d)(6) (Supp.
1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 1l 1.34(l)(b) (West Supp. 1984); 56 111.
Admin. Reg. § 2500.40(a) (1982).
60. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4573(4) (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
296.020 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:3(XIII) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(2) (Page
Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § I 1.34(2)(b) (West Supp. 1984).
Cf. High, 29 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,866; Lewis, 314
N.W.2d I (Minn. 1981); Bucyrus-Erie Co., 90 Wis. 2d 408, 280
N.W.2d 142; Pacific Motor Trucking Co., 33 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 34,27 1;Amtrak, 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,420; 56
Ill. Admin. Reg. § 2500.40(a) (1982).
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tion to extending protection. 6' Most statutes which mention
disease or illness do so in an apparent effort to establish that a
physical impairment caused by an illness can be the basis for
protection in the same manner as a defect caused by genetics or
injuries. 62 In those states the language employed is consistent
with an interpretation that impairment due to an ongoing illness
is covered--although that interpretation may not be an "exact
fit" with the tone of the statute-so long as other requirements
of the statute (that the individual be otherwise qualified, not
present a significant safety hazard to others) are met. All of the
statutes share the underlying concept that persons whose physi-
cal abilities are impaired should not be deprived of work which
they are capable of performing, and that each individual job
applicant or current employee should be judged on the basis of
his or her present ability to meet the bona fide physical
requirements of a job. Given this underlying policy, discrimina-
tion against persons with AIDS should be presumed to come
within the statutory protection of most jurisdictions unless the
express working of the statute would contradict such a pre-
sumption. Likewise, a person with CDC-defined AIDS should
fall within the scope of the statutory definitions which require
"impairment of life activities" or "limitations upon physical
ability" because AIDS impairs the "essential life function" of
the immune system, limiting the ability of the body to fight
infection and preserve health, and causing physical debilitation
that affects strength and endurance.
Persons who do not have CDC-defined AIDS, and who
thus may not technically be considered "disabled," but who
are subject to discrimination because they belong to "risk
groups" or have milder symptoms indicative of possible devel-
opment of the syndrome, should also be protected in those
jurisdictions which accept the concept of protection for persons
"regarded" or "perceived" as being handicapped. 63 Thus, if
an individual is discharged or refused employment because he
or she is a member of an AIDS risk group who has developed
lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph glands), that person should
be statutorily protected because the motivation of the employer
is the same unlawful motivation as that expressly condemned
by the statute: animus against a class of individuals which
unfairly ignores their individual qualifications and is based on
prejudicial beliefs about the class. Conceptualized in this way,
61. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. § 207.140
(1981); 31 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:3(13) (1984). See
supra notes 37-38.
62. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(13) (1984); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 12926(h) (1980) ("health impairment"); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-51(15) (West Supp. 1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §
1709(4) (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(7)(A) (1979);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.1103(b) (West Supp. 1984);
MONT. CODE. ANN. § 49-3-101(4) (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. §
48.1102(8) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10-5-5(q) (West
Supp. 1984); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. § 121.003 (Vernon
1982) (health impairment). See also MD. ADMIN. CODE. §
14.03.02 (1982).
63. See supra note 35. The most widely used definition of "handi-
cap," that contained in the federal Rehabilitation Act, expressly
provides protection for those regarded as being handicapped. 29
U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982). Several other jurisdictions, as noted
above, have incorporated this concept in their administrative regu-
lations, or guidelines. See Comment, supra note 34, at 541-42.
Some courts, as noted, have adopted the concept as an interpreta-
tion of a statute which does not expressly include it. Id. at 542-48.
See Note, supra note 43.
the case of a person "perceived" to have AIDS provides a
strong argument for statutory protection even in those states
where the statute speaks only of protecting the "disabled,"
because the actions of the employer are motivated by unlawful
prejudice.
V. Employer Defenses
Determining that the antidiscrimination laws apply to
persons with AIDS does not end the inquiry. There are affirma-
tive defenses that may be raised by employers, some of which
may have a strong appeal to "neutral" decisionmakers. Be-
cause CDC-defined AIDS is at present apparently incurable and
frequently fatal, 64 and because the mechanism of transmission
is not definitely established, fear of the disease may be as great
a motivating factor as malice or dislike for those afflicted or
perceived as afflicted with the syndrome. This fear may, to the
extent it appears genuine or justified, infect the decision-
making process.
65
The foremost affirmative defense in an AIDS case is
fear of contagion. 66 Unfortunately, in the short time since laws
against disability discrimination have been passed, there has
been virtually no case law involving infectious conditions. 67 As
a result, any predictions as to how decisionmakers will deal
with this defense will have to be based more on logic and
64. N.Y. Native, Oct. 8, 1984, at 17; id., Nov. 5, 1984, at 16.
65. A startling illustration of the fears generated by publicity about
AIDS is provided by an incident in a New York City trial court on
October 23, 1984. A man diagnosed as having AIDS was standing
trial for a murder committed prior to his diagnosis. The judge had
called upon the City Health Commissioner to appear personally to
assure court personnel and jurors that they were not endangered by
the defendant's presence in the courtroom. The defendant wore a
surgical mask. Despite the health official's statement to those in the
courtroom that "AIDS was not transmitted through the air and that
they did not have to be concerned about being in the same
courtroom with the defendant," half of the prospective jurors
asked to be excused, and court officers insisted on wearing masks
and surgical gloves. The judge denied defense counsel's request
that the officers be ordered to remove their protective paraphernalia
to avoid prejudicing the jury. The president of the court officers'
union was quoted as fearing for the health of the officers because
"germs are spreading all over the court." Shenon, Court Officers
Wear Masks and Gloves at Trial of a Defendant with AIDS, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1984, at BI, col. 1. See also 3 Emp. Rel. Weekly
(BNA), April 1, 1985, at 387.
66. This defense is illustrated by the case of Todd Shuttleworth, a
31-year-old Floridian with AIDS, who was discharged from a
public sector clerical job after his employer learned of the diagno-
sis. The employer stated in justification of the discharge: "The
doctor could not tell us that there was absolutely no chance that
Todd might transmit the disease to others; we couldn't get that 100
percent guarantee. We just couldn't take the chance of anything
happening to fellow employees or anyone else visiting the office.
Anyone who has AIDS usually dies-it's not just the case of
infecting someone with a disease that is curable." Shuttleworth,
who was physically able to work despite his AIDS infection,
countered that several of his coworkers were permitted to smoke in
the office even though doctors could not assure that exposure to
smoke would not cause lung cancer, suggesting a double standard
existed. The Weekly News (Miami, Fla.), Sept. 26, 1984, at 3; 3
Emp. Rel. Weekly (BNA), supra note 65. Similar justifications
have been offered by employers in New York City cases handled by
the New York Pro Bono Panel. Shebar interview, supra note 10.
67. A review of published decisions in BNA and CCH reporters
revealed no cases in which infection or contagion was an issue.
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analogy than actual precedent. If AIDS presents a significant
threat of infection to coworkers or customers of the employer, it
would seem well-established, by virtue of cases focusing on
safety issues in the workplace, that the affirmative defense
would prevail. 68 Indeed, two state antidiscrimination statutes
expressly exclude from coverage individuals with "communica-
ble diseases," apparently without regard for how the diseases
might be transmitted in the workplace. 69 Many state statutes, or
accompanying administrative interpretations, recognize the safety
of the individual employee, coworkers, customers, and the
public at large as a legitimate concern. 7° However, medical
facts concerning AIDS indicate that the infection issue may turn
on questions not yet answerable-in particular the question of
when an individual is contagious. If, by the time opportunistic
infections appear, the virus has run its course and destroyed the
body's T-helper lymphocytes, then it is possible that category
III individuals are not sources of contagion, even though they
may exhibit physical symptoms (such as skin lesions) that
frighten others. 71 If the AIDS virus is transmissible during its
incubation period, when there are no apparent physical symp-
toms, then category I individuals would appear most vulnerable
to the contagion defense, although the epidemiology of the
disease suggests that such individuals will not present any
danger to others by virtue of casual contact in the workplace.
The most difficult case concerns category II individuals,
who are presently experiencing significant discrimination.
Unfortunately, it is not known whether persons exhibiting the
"warning" symptoms are infectious. However, the question of
whether an individual is infectious should not be as important
with respect to job discrimination as the question of how an
individual is infectious. If the disease is only transmissible
through types of physical contact which would not occur in the
performance of the job, then discrimination against the individ-
ual based on fear of infection is logically unjustified even when
the individual is technically "infectious" for the disease. Thus
far, public health authorities have taken the view that AIDS is
not transmissible through the sort of casual, nonintimate contact
characteristic of most work situations.
72
68. See, e.g., Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Wisconsin, 90 Wis. 2d 408,
419-22, 280 N.W2d 142, 147-49 (1979); Amtrak, 31 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 33,420.
69. See GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6A-3 (1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
207.140 (Baldwin 1981).
70. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
71. Studies to detect the presence of HTLV-III in saliva were reported
in October 1984, to have revealed none of the virus present in
individuals who had CDC-defined AIDS. However, the virus was
present in the saliva of eight of 18 of the individuals who had
so-called "pre-AIDS" symptoms or close contact with individuals
who had AIDS. With regard to these studies, National Institutes of
Health researcher Dr. Robert C. Gallo stated: "There is not yet
clear-cut epidemiological evidence that the virus is transmitted by
saliva to cause AIDS, yet this now has to be considered. The
question remains open whether saliva is a significant means of
transmission. It is there and has to be studied but I don't think
saliva is a major route of transmission of AIDS in humans." N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at CI, C5, col. 1.
72. See supra note 21. In the only reported judicial opinion which
considered transmission of AIDS, a trial judge in New York was
convinced by expert testimony that AIDS was not transmitted by
casual contact. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 120 Misc. 2d 697, 703, 467
N.Y.S.2d 302, 307 (Sup. Ct. 1983). A labor arbitrator, considering
expert medical testimony in an employee discharge case, reached
the same conclusion. Guilfoy, supra note 31.
Another affirmative defense which might be raised is
expense to the employer occasioned by health coverage costs
and employee absenteeism. If an employee in category I progresses
to category II, it is likely that the employee's attendance record
at work will suffer. Category III employees will almost certainly
have to miss periods of work due to required treatment or
occasional episodes of serious infection requiring bedrest or
hospitalization. Furthermore, if an employee claims coverage
under an employee health benefit plan for the extensive treat-
ments required for opportunistic infections, the employer's
insurance premium rates may be raised to reflect the increased
claims under the employer's policy. However, statutes, regula-
tions, and case law have usually rejected the arguments of
employers that employees who had the potential for incurring
such expenses or inconvenience due to their disability were not
protected from discrimination. 73 The antidiscrimination legisla-
tion represents a policy decision that employers must bear some
of society's cost in providing work opportunities for the dis-
abled. The decision to extend legal protection against discrimi-
nation must be held to have been made with the realization that
some additional costs would be imposed on employers, because
it could reasonably be expected that disabled persons may,
through no fault of their own, have occasional attendance
problems not experienced by other employees, or may occa-
sionally make larger claims on employee health coverage sys-
tems than nondisabled employees. The question is one of
reasonableness. If a category II or category III employee's
attendance is so sporadic that he or she could not accurately be
characterized as a regular, full-time employee, and the employ-
er needs to have regular, full-time coverage on the job, then
medical leave might be justifiable on attendance grounds.
However, by analogy to existing case law refusing to recognize
such a defense with respect to other disabilities, adverse action
based on a prediction that a category I, II, or III employee will
become an unreasonable economic burden on the employer
would not be permissible.
Affirmative defenses to civil rights legislation based
upon nonacceptance of members of the protected class by
coworkers or customers have been rejected in race and sex
discrimination cases. 74 However, these defenses are worth
mentioning here because fear generated by AIDS has created
public uncertainty about the safety of employing persons with
AIDS as restaurant workers, hairdressers, or health care workers.
75
Some cases of discrimination have been encountered in which
the motivation of the employer was stated as fear that customers
would stay away, or that coworkers had refused or would refuse
73. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also State Div. of
Human Rights v. Xerox Corp., N.Y.L.J., May 8, 1985, at 1, col. 2
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1985); Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Department of
Indus. Labor & Human Relations, 14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
344, 345 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1976).
74. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 E2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) (sex discrimination); Diaz v. Pan
Am World Airways, Inc., 442 E2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), on remand, 346 E Supp. 1301 (D.
Fla. 1972) (sex discrimination); Wigginess, Inc. v. Fruchtman, 482
E Supp. 681, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), affd, 628 E2d 1346 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (sex discrimination). Cf.
Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 E2d 1179, 1181-82 (7th
Cir. 1982) (racial and sex discrimination). See 29 C.FR. §
1604.2(a)(l)(iii) (1984) (sex).
75. LAMBDA, supra note 5, at 1-4; Flaherty, supra note 5.
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to work in proximity to persons with AIDS. Assuming rejection
of the contagion defense, this separate defense should carry no
weight, since the coworker and customer rejections are based
on the same prejudices and misinformation that would be
unlawful if they directly motivated the employer's decision to
discriminate. It may seem unfair to place the burden on the
employer to educate the public, but this burden has been placed
on employers with respect to race and sex discrimination, and it
has been held in both instances that the underlying statutory
purpose to eliminate discrimination in employment cannot give
way to the uninformed prejudices of the market place. 76 Several
state laws against disability discrimination have been construed
by enforcement agencies to forbid discrimination based upon
rejection or disapproval by coworkers, customers, or the public.77
The futility defense may also be raised by employers,
who would contend that it is pointless to invest training in an
employee or applicant with AIDS because the disease is fatal
and the individual will not be employable long enough to justify
the investment. While it is true that AIDS (although not
necessarily all the opportunistic infections associated with the
syndrome) is at present apparently untreatable and frequently
fatal, and that it can be assumed with fair probability that
category IV individuals will probably die from the disease
within a few years of diagnosis, new developments in research
and treatment are now occurring quickly enough to offer hope
that category III individuals may not invariably die. 78 Current
evidence also suggests that a significant portion of category I
and category II individuals may never develop the full AIDS
syndrome. 79 Consequently, discrimination against employees or
job applicants based on the futility argument must be viewed
with considerable skepticism in cases involving category I and
category II employees, and at least with a demand for more
individualized scrutiny of the particular case with respect to
category III employees. An individual who is receiving success-
ful treatment for skin lesions, and, generally, is otherwise
healthy and able to work, should not be denied employment on
the mere possibility that development of a later opportunistic
infection may curtail his working ability.
Finally, employers may advance the "altruistic" defense
that they are concerned for the employee's own health, which
would be endangered by working. This defense, which is
articulated in several state statutes and regulations, s8 requires
particularized analysis in each case, depending upon the re-
quirements of the job and the physical condition of the employ-
ee in question. In the absence of evidence that working is an
aggravating risk factor for individuals in categories I, H, or HI,
this defense should not prevail unless it can be shown with
reasonable certainty that the particular physical conditions of
the job are such as to aggravate the disease or interfere with its
76. See cases cited supra note 74.
77. These constructions are sometimes contained in express regulations
or guidelines published by the agencies, and sometimes in the text
of the law itself. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2503(a) (1981);
ME. COMM. REGS. § 3.08(B); MorT. COMM. Rut.S § 24.9.1404;
N.J. COMM. RULES OF PRACTICE, § 13.11-1.5; OHIo ADMIN.
CODE § 4112-5-08(D)(2)(c)(i) (1980); OR. COMM. RULES §
839-06-250; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-22-040; W. VA. COMM.
PRULES § 4.06.
78. Scott, supra note 25, at 10.
79. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
80. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985).
treatment.8 1 Furthermore, a response to the "altruistic" defense
might demand exploration of a reasonable accommodation of
the employee's needs that would lessen the relevance of the
defense. For example, a hospital employee might be reassigned
to a different work station in which similar work is performed
without constant exposure to infectious patients, if such a
position exists. Such accommodations might be difficult in jobs
covered by union agreements which limit employer discretion to
shift job assignments.8 2 However, it is possible to argue that the
Title VII case law (under which such union restrictions might
limit the employee accommodation obligation) is applicable to
the non-Title VII realm of disability discrimination, because the
federal Rehabilitation Act and some state civil rights laws
covering disabilities do not have the same express protections
for bona fide union security systems as Title VII."3
A review of these defenses and the arguments which
may be raised in response to them illustrates that the question
whether a particular person with AIDS is entitled to redress for
discriminatory discharge, reassignment, or refusal to hire can-
not be easily answered in the abstract. The answer in each case
will depend on a wide variety of factors, including the particu-
lar statutory coverage applicable to the job, the nature of the
job, the present state of the employee's physical condition, and
the present state of knowledge about AIDS. It is reasonable to
conclude that in most states with disability discrimination laws,
as well as in employment under federal contracts or in programs
receiving federal financial assistance (most ubiquitously, state
and local government agencies, hospitals, and schools), protec-
tion against discrimination should extend to employees in cate-
gories I, II, or III who are physically able to work at jobs which
do not require intimate physical contact with coworkers or
customers and which do not involve close, continuous contact
with infectious individuals suffering from communicable dis-
eases transmissible by casual physical contact or respiration. As
AIDS research progresses, the protection afforded by present
laws will necessarily be adjusted to reflect new information
about the disease's transmissibility and the factors bearing upon
its progress in infected individuals.
Vl. Conclusion
The AIDS crisis presents a significant challenge to civil
rights attorneys who are presented with clients whose particular
problem may not appear to be directly contemplated by the
existing statutory scheme in many jurisdictions. The unusual
disease at issue does not always fit neatly into the framework of
present disability law, and members of some of the "risk
groups" involved (such as homosexuals and intravenous drug
81. However, some agencies expressly forbid present discrimination
against an employee on the basis that a present nondisqualifying
impairment may become disqualifying in the future. See, e.g., W.
VA. COMM. RULES, § 4.05.
82. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63
(1977).
83. Title VII expressly provides that observance of bona fide seniority
systems, such as those which may be contained in collective
bargaining agreements, is not a violation of the civil rights law. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982); Hardison, 432 U.S., at 81-83. No
similar provision is contained in the federal Rehabilitation Act. 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (1982).
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abusers) may not themselves be members of protected classes
under existing civil rights laws in many jurisdictions.' This
latter problem is illustrated by cases in which employees have
been subjected to discharge when their sexual orientation or
drug use was first discovered by their employer in connection
84. Only one state, Wisconsin, forbids discrimination in employment
on the basis of sexual orientation, although many municipalities
have adopted ordinances embodying such protection. See generally,
E. BOGGAN, M. HAFT, C. LisTER, J. Rupp & T. STODDARD, AN
ACLU HANDBOOK: THE RIGHTS OF GAY PEOPLE (rev. ed. 1983).
The federal Rehabilitation Act, in common with many state laws,
expressly excludes drug abusers from coverage under its employ-
ment provisions. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982).
with a diagnosis of AIDS.8 5 The employee may have no redress
if the stated reason for termination is sexual orientation or drug
use unless the employee's job is covered by statutory protection
on those bases. However, most cases to date have centered on
the disease itself as the provocation for the discrimination, and
innovative use of the existing statutory framework should pro-
vide significant protection for many employees who suffer
discrimination as a result of the AIDS crisis.
85. Most evidence that this occurs is anecdotal. However, in cases
involving military personnel subject to immediate discharge under
military regulations if their homosexuality is revealed, a diagnosis
of AIDS has led to immediate loss of employment and denial of
employment-related disability benefits. See AIDS LEGAL GUIDE,
supra note 5, at 50-56; Comment, supra note 1, at 733.
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The Sentencing Project
of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency
The Sentencing Project is a program of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency and is housed in the
Council's Washington, D.C., office.
The Sentencing Project provides technical assistance to public defenders, assigned counsel administrators, or
others motivated to reduce the use of incarceration and to constructively assist defendants at sentencing. The Project
assists defense counsel in eight localities in their efforts to serve the public interest by proposing carefully constructed
alternative sentencing plans with which courts can decrease their reliance upon prison and long-term jail sentences as
a form of punishment, thereby reducing prison and jail overcrowding and costs.
To accomplish its objectives, the Sentencing Project:
* has awarded technical assistance grants to state public defender offices, local public defenders, or criminal
justice programs in the states of Connecticut, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee;
" is assisting public defenders or assigned counsel in each of the selected localities to obtain adequate funding
for alternative sentencing programs;
* is helping defense attorneys and public officials in each of the selected localities to plan comprehensive and
effective alternative sentencing programs;
* provides administrative and skills training to defense attorneys, alternative sentencing workers, and those
who will operate new or existing programs in the selected localities;
" is designing monitoring and evaluation programs by which defense lawyers and public officials can measure
the effectiveness of alternative sentencing programs in their jurisdictions; and
* serves as a repository and a distribution center for case materials, law review articles, and commentary
about corrections, sentencing practices, and the defense attorney's role at sentencing.
The Sentencing Project brings to its work information and training resources from well-respected sentencing
reform organizations such as the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives in Alexandria, Virginia, and the
National Institute for Sentencing Alternatives at Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts. It draws upon the
experience of its Director, staff of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, and staff in alternative sentencing
programs now working with defense attorneys in such cities as Washington, D.C.; West Palm Beach, Florida; New
York City, New York; Fayetteville, North Carolina; Portland, Oregon; and Nashville, Tennessee.
Malcolm C. Young, a former defense attorney from Chicago, directs the Sentencing Project. Until 1984, Mr.
Young directed the National Legal Aid and Defender Association's Alternative Sentencing/Sentencing Advocacy
Project, which fostered seven defense-based alternative sentencing programs over three years.
The Sentencing Project is supported by a grant from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation. For more
information, contact the Sentencing Project, 2025 Eye St., Suite 501, Washington, DC 20006, (202) 463-8348.
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